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In	 designing	 architecture	 we	 put	 forward	 ways	 in	 which	 to	 live,	 enabling	 particular	
patterns	 of	 living	 while	 limiting	 other	 possibilities.	 In	 this	 sense	 architecture	 has	 a	
normative	 function	 and	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 way	 that	 ethical	 theories	 and	moral	
codes	 purport	 to	 guide	 us	 on	 how	 to	 live.	 Given	 this,	 I	 suggest	 that	 ethical	 reflection	
about	 how	 we	 design—and	 in	 particular	 about	 how	 we	 constitute	 the	 relationship	
between	 designers	 and	 those	 they	 design	 for—can	 be	 used	 to	 help	 formulate	 ethical	
questions	regarding	how	we	speak	and	reason	about	ethics	itself.	Recognising	Heinz	von	
Foerster’s	criticisms	of	moral	codes	as	an	instance	of	this,	I	use	the	example	of	designing	




In	 relating	 systems	 thinking	 and	 design,	 one	 possible	 focus	 is	 that	 of	 ethics	 and	
especially	 those	 ethical	 quandaries	 that	 designers	 encounter.	 Similarly	 to	 calls	 for	
designers	 to	 learn	 from	 moral	 philosophy	 in	 order	 to	 grapple	 more	 fully	 with	 the	








refer	 to	we	 receive	 different,	 and	 often	 directly	 conflicting,	 guidance	 as	 to	what	 to	 do	
(see	 e.g.	 MacIntyre,	 1981/1985,	 pp.	 6-7).	 As	 I	 have	 discussed	 elsewhere	 (Sweeting,	
2015c),	 some	 of	 the	 most	 common	 approaches	 to	 normative	 ethics	 (deontology,	
consequentialism)	 rely	 on	procedures	 (predefined	 rules,	 optimisation)	 that	 have	been	
shown	to	be	unworkable	in	the	complex	situations	that	designers	commonly	encounter	
and	deal	with	as	a	matter	of	course.	The	process	of	exchange	between	systems	thinking	





look	 to	 the	 ethical	 qualities	 and	 quandaries	 of	 design	 activity	 itself	 with	 a	 view	 to	
informing	our	understanding	of	ethics	more	generally.		
	
In	this	paper	I	explore	this	 topic	by	taking	architecture	 in	particular	as	a	 focus.	This	 is	
partly	because	it	is	my	own	discipline,	but	also	because	of	the	sorts	of	ethical	questions	
that	 architecture	prompts	 about	how	we	design.	Architecture	 is	 too	big	 to	be	 avoided	
(we	don’t	opt	in	to	it),	yet	it	is	also	so	intimate	that	it	constrains	and	structures	everyday	
life.	 While	 technological	 change	 is	 slow	 to	 impact	 on	 architecture,	 this	 bind	 mirrors	
many	 of	 the	 ethical	 complexities	 that	 follow	 from	 the	 reach	 of	 contemporary	 socio-





The	argument	 that	 I	put	 forward	here	 is	 somewhat	unusual	 in	 structure.	My	concerns	
are	not	with	ethical	issues	in	architecture	per	se.	Rather,	by	reviewing	Karsten	Harries’	
formulation	 of	 the	 shared	 concerns	 between	 architecture	 and	 ethics,	 I	 suggest	 that	
ethical	 questions	 regarding	 how	 we	 design	 architecture—and	 particularly	 those	







One	 major	 contribution	 to	 architectural	 debates	 about	 ethics	 is	 that	 of	 philosopher	
Karsten	Harries	(1987,	1997),	who	has	suggested	understanding	architecture	in	ethical	
terms	because	of	 the	way	 it	puts	 forward	an	ethos	or	way	of	 life.	Referring	 to	Ludwig	
Wittgenstein’s	 (1953/2009)	 summary	 of	 the	 philosophical	 questions	 as	 those	 of	 the	
form	 “I	 don't	 know	 my	 way	 about”,	 Harries	 characterises	 the	 role	 of	 philosophy	 as	
helping	 us	 to	 navigate	 profound	 uncertainties	 about	 how	 to	 live	 and	 goes	 on	 to	
recognise	 common	 cause	 with	 architecture	 in	 this	 task	 (Harries,	 1987,	 p.	 29).	 As	 an	
attempt	to	recapture	something	of	the	social	mission	of	modernist	architecture,	Harries	













does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 thought	 of	 in	 terms	 of	 grand	 themes	 such	 as	 dwelling	 and	
authenticity,	nor	in	the	sense	of	modernism’s	social	agenda.	It	can	instead	be	understood	
in	 much	 more	 prosaic	 terms:	 in	 an	 everyday	 sense,	 architecture	 enables	 particular	
patterns	 of	 living	 while	 limiting	 other	 possibilities.	 This	 impact	 makes	 designing	
architecture	 ethically	 significant	 even	where	 there	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 grand	 issues	 at	
stake,	such	that	Harries’	position	can	be	reformulated	in	less	escalated	terms.	Whatever	






While	debate	 over	 the	 ethical	 qualities	 of	 buildings	 themselves	 is	 a	 significant	 area	 of	
discourse	 in	 architectural	 theory	 (e.g.	 the	 way	 a	 building	 might	 embody	 an	 ethical	
quality,	 or	 might	 be	 an	 agent	 in	 an	 ethical	 issue),	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 architecture	 is	
designed	is	an	area	of	concern	in	its	own	right.	This	goes	beyond	issues	of	professional	
ethics	and	is	not	limited	to	only	how	architects	respond	to	explicit	ethical	challenges	in	
their	 work	 such	 as,	 say,	 environmental	 impact.	 In	 even	 the	 most	 straightforward	
circumstances	there	is	still	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	designers	and	those	
they	design	 for,	where	 there	 is	 an	asymmetry	between	 those	with	agency	over	design	
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Designing	 architecture	 involves	 something	 of	 a	 bind,	 which	 can	 be	 summarised	 as	 a	
combination	 of	 significance,	 contestability	 and	 asymmetry.	Most	 design	 questions	 are	
not	satisfactorily	a	matter	of	the	preference	of	the	designer,	as	they	impact	on	others	in	
significant	ways.	However,	neither	can	they	be	resolved	objectively	(for	reasons	that	are	
well	 established;	 see	 for	 instance	Rittel	&	Webber,	 1973).	 It	 follows	 that	 even	 though	












This	 is	 suggestive	 of	 a	 further	 parallel.	 If	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 we	 can	 see	
architecture	 and	 theories	 of	 normative	 ethics	 in	 similar	 terms,	 then	 the	 designing	 of	





moral	 codes	are	put	 forward	on	 the	basis	 that	 they	give	guidance	as	 to	 ethically	 good	
actions,	 they	 do	 not	 invite	 reflection	 on	 how	 they	 themselves	 are	 discussed	 or	
propagated,	with	the	complexities	of	such	issues	tending	to	be	hidden	under	the	catchall	
of	 application	 or	 behind	 assumptions	 of	 self-justification.	 Whereas	 the	 field	 of	 meta-










and	design	 (e.g.	 Glanville,	 2004,	 2007,	 2014;	Herr,	 2015;	 Sweeting,	 2015a).	 Indeed,	 to	




Von	Foerster	 (1992),	 like	Harries,	draws	on	Wittgenstein,	 founding	his	argument	on	a	
quotation	from	the	Tractatus:	“it	is	clear	that	ethics	cannot	be	articulated”	(Wittgenstein,	
1921/1974,	6.421,	von	Foerster's	own	translation).	That	is,	in	putting	ethics	into	words,	
such	as	 in	moral	 codes,	we	concern	ourselves	with	what	others	should	do	rather	 than	
with	 our	 own	 actions.	 Von	 Foerster	 suggests	 that,	 instead,	 we	 keep	 our	 ethical	








Given	 the	 contestability	 and	 significance	 of	 answers	 to	 complex	 ethical	 questions,	 the	











high-handed	 tone	 adopted	 by	 the	 modern	 movement	 and	 critiques	 of	 architects	 as	
pursuing	their	own	agendas	at	the	expense	of	those	they	design	for	(e.g.	Till,	2009).	It	is	






maintained	 in	 practice.	 There	 are,	 for	 instance,	 situations	 where	 ethics	 needs	 to	 be	
discussed	 explicitly,	 where	 not	 doing	 so	 would	 lead	 to	 acquiescence	 rather	 than	
responsibility,	where	our	responsibility	includes	responsibility	for	others	and	so	cannot	
be	 confined	 to	 the	personal,	 or	where	our	 actions	 articulate	 ethics	whichever	way	we	
compose	our	language.	To	take	designing	a	building	as	an	example,	we	cannot	in	the	end	
keep	 ethics	 implicit	 because	 architecture	 itself	 is	 an	 articulation	 of	 a	way	 of	 living,	 as	
discussed	 above.	 Indeed,	 intervening	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 others	 is	 the	 very	 point	 of	 the	
discipline:	 one	 would	 not	 want	 an	 architecture	 that	 was	 not	 a	 significant	 act	 in	 the	
world,	creating	new	possibilities	in	some	way.	
	
Designers	 have	 many	 ways	 of	 responding	 to	 this	 challenge,	 often	 by	 involving	 other	
stakeholders	 in	 the	 design	 process,	whether	 through	 participatory	 design	methods	 or	
more	standard	forms	of	consultation.	As	I	have	suggested	elsewhere,	the	core	methods	
that	designers	use	in	addressing	the	complex	situations	they	face	take	a	conversational	
form	 that,	 seen	 in	 cybernetic	 terms,	 implicitly	 involves	 a	 number	 of	 ethical	
considerations	(Kenniff	&	Sweeting,	2014;	Sweeting,	2014,	2015b,	2015c).	For	instance,	
the	 interactive	way	 in	which	designers	work	enables	 them	to	think	though	the	eyes	of	
those	others	they	design	for	(Cf.	von	Foerster,	1991)	even	in	the	drawings	and	models	
they	construct	primarily	 for	 themselves,	 for	 instance	 in	the	way	they	“walk	through”	a	
plan.	Similarly,	design	activity	involves	the	pursuit	of	internal	not	just	external	purposes	




that	 design	 practice	 is	 always	 ethically	 good	 or	 that	 designers’	 ideas	 are	 ethically	
authoritative,	 as	 is	 clear,	 indeed,	 from	 the	history	of	 that	 architecture	which	has	been	
put	 forward	 in	heroically	 ethical	 terms.	We	 can,	 however,	 understand	design	 as	being	
ethical	 in	 a	 different	 sense,	 as	 implicitly	 involving	 and	 being	 concerned	 with	 ethical	
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considerations	 and	 questioning,	 in	 a	 similar	 sense	 to	 that	 advocated	 by	 von	 Foerster.	
This	 is	significant	for	von	Foerster’s	position	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	while	von	Foerster’s	
call	 to	 keep	 ethics	 implicit	 can	 seem	 idealistic,	 not	 just	 in	 design	 but	 also	 in	 complex	
social	situations	more	generally,	we	can	see	design	as	a	way	of	acting,	applicable	even	in	
complex	and	ethical	 charged	 circumstances,	 in	which	 this	 is	 achieved	 to	at	 least	 some	
extent.	Secondly,	the	context	of	design	offers	a	realm	in	which	to	develop	von	Foerster’s	
position,	circumventing	the	difficulty	of	extending	it	either	theoretically	or	through	case	
studies	 given	 that	 such	 articulation	 may,	 according	 to	 its	 own	 account,	 lead	 to	
moralisation.	
	
Like	 conversation	 more	 generally	 (Glanville,	 2004),	 design	 requires	 ethical	
considerations	of	this	sort	in	order	to	be	practiced	well	in	its	own	terms.	That	there	are	
ethical	 considerations	 already	 implicit	 in	 core	 design	 activities	 suggests	 that	we	 need	
not	see	 the	relationship	between	ethics	and	design,	as	 is	so	often	 the	case,	 in	 terms	of	
trade-offs	between	the	two.	This	is	to	shift	the	focus	of	the	relationship	between	ethics	
and	 design	 away	 from	 the	 application	 of	 ethical	 theories	 or	 standards	 with	 which	 to	
correct	 practice.	 Instead	 of	making	 judgements	 about	what	 is	 ethically	 good,	which	 is	
often	impossible	or	even	counterproductive,	we	might	instead	focus	on	how	and	to	what	




Such	 an	 approach	might	 be	 extended	 to	 how	we	 speak	 and	 reason	 about	 ethics	 itself,	
understood,	 as	 introduced	 above,	 as	 an	 activity	 to	which	 ethical	 considerations	 apply.	
For	 instance,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	 the	 two	 most	 common	 forms	 of	 normative	 ethical	
theory—consequentialism	 and	 deontology—exclude	 the	 sort	 of	 implicit	 ethical	
consideration	that	I	have	noted	to	be	present	in	design.	In	following	predefined	rules	or	
optimising	 against	 set	 goals,	 one	 cannot	 take	 the	 views	 of	 others	 into	 account,	 take	
personal	 responsibility	 for	 one’s	 action	 or	 pursue	 purposes	 internal	 to	 it	 because,	 by	
adopting	such	an	approach,	one’s	course	of	action	is	already	set.	This	accounts	in	part,	I	
suggest,	for	what	Alasdair	MacIntyre	(1981/1985)	has	observed	to	be	the	“shrill	tone”	of	
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